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Abstract 
Gelenbe, E. and M. Hernindez, Virus tests to maximize availability of software systems, Theoretical 
Computer Science 125 (1994) 131-147. 
Software systems in which many user’s or programmers intervene may easily contain software items 
_ such as viruses which will endanger the integrity of the system. This paper proposes that in 
addition to the conventional recovery techniques, such as dumps and roll-back recovery, system 
availability be enhanced by the introduction of virus tests or other types of “failure tests”. We present 
a model to analyze the effect of the failure rate, the frequency of virus and failure testing, and the 
frequency of periodic dumps, on global system availability. We assume that the “failure” rate of the 
system increases as time elapses beyond any individual instant at which a virus test or failure test has 
been carried out. Thus, we are dealing with a system in which failures will be naturally time- 
dependent. We compute the optimum value of the interval between dumps, and also the best time 
interval between virus or failure tests for this system. In order to illustrate the methodology of this 
work, numerical examples are presented for various time-dependent failure statistics. 
1. Introduction 
All software systems either large or small need to be protected from catastrophic 
failures, in case portions of the system architecture which support them fail. This is 
particularly true for large database systems in which several layers of recovery 
procedures are usually built into the software [lo]. In such systems, variants of the 
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checkpoint and roll-back recovery mechanism are used in order to enhance overall 
system reliability [15,2]. 
The problem also arises in other systems which have a transaction-like behavior. 
For instance, in a large software development project in which modifications are 
carried out progressively and then validated periodically (very much as in a transac- 
tion oriented system in which updates are made and then validated) it may be 
necessary to introduce failure recovery mechanisms which protect the development 
activity from losses of information which may occur when there are system or 
subsystem failures. 
Any such failure recovery mechanism is bound to induce additional costs 
and overhead, both during normal operation and during failure recovery. This is 
why much attention has been devoted to the performance of failure recovery 
mechanisms. 
The earliest work in this area is that of [17], who has attempted to optimize the 
time between checkpoints in a database so as to obtain a satisfactory compromise 
between the time it takes to create a checkpoint, and the time it takes to recover from 
a failure. Indeed, the cost of checkpointing is high if checkpoints are frequent, but the 
advantage is then that in case of failure the recovery time will be shorter [3]. Other 
authors have analyzed the transaction queue length, or maximized system availability 
[7,6], or considered response time as a primary measure of system performance [ 11, 
or examined the creation of checkpoints as a function of the number of transactions 
which occur between successive checkpoints [13]. These results have been extended to 
distributed systems [2,8,11], and to time-dependent failure rates [9]. The relationship 
between these models to queueing systems with service time interruptions has also 
been considered [12]. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a technique which we call “virus tests, or 
failure tests” for enhancing system availability. This is a very natural idea, since it is 
done in a routine manner in many systems. However, here, we assume that these 
“failure tests” will be carried out automatically at predetermined instants, much like 
checkpoints are carried out automatically under predetermined conditions in 
a database management system. It is assumed that the system operates with a dump- 
ing and roll-back recovery strategy for secondary memory failures. However, in 
addition, we imagine that certain database “failures” are in fact due to the introduc- 
tion into the system of inconsistent or erroneous data, or more probably of some 
malicious code usually called a “virus”, which at a later time may lead to the detection 
of a “failure” or to some other undesirable event. 
Thus, we propose that in addition to the conventional recovery technique, the 
system availability be enhanced by the introduction of “failure tests” (or if you wish 
“virus tests”), which would be implemented as a set of procedures which examine the 
code, the data and/or the log of transactions which have been executed, in order to 
detect potential sources of failures or of inconsistencies. 
After each failure test, one or more errors (or viruses, or failures, etc.) may or may 
not be detected in the system or data. If at least one failure or virus is detected, we 
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assume that the system has to go through a recovery procedure just as if there had 
been a system failure, using the most recent checkpoint. Otherwise transaction 
processing proceeds normally. 
As a result of virus or failure testing, we expect the global system failure rate to 
behave in saw-tooth fashion as a function of time. Just after a failure test, possibly 
followed by a recovery procedure, the system failure rate drops to a low value because 
most of the potential sources of failures will have been detected in the failure test. The 
failure rate then increases as transaction processing proceeds and as we move away 
from the instant at which a virus or failure test was carried out. Thus, these tests can be 
viewed as a form of preventive maintenance carried out on the system’s data, code, 
and past transactions. 
The purpose of this procedure is clearly to improve system availability. Therefore, 
in the next section we shall present a model of the system in order to analyze the effect 
of the failure rate, the failure (or virus) tests, and the periodic dumps, on global system 
availability. We then compute the optimum value of the interval between dumps, and 
also the best time interval between failure tests for this system. The primary perfor- 
mance measure considered is the availability of the system for useful transaction 
processing. In the sequel we will indistinctly talk about failure tests or virus tests but it 
is clear that we are thinking primarily of all forms of testing, and specially about virus 
testing, which is aimed at removing malicious or nonmalicious sources of future 
failures or data inconsistencies. 
Clearly, as the frequency of dumps (i.e. checkpoints) and of failure tests increases, so 
does the overhead related to these actions. However, the likelihood of failures and the 
subsequent costs related to failure recovery decrease. Therefore, it is important to 
determine the appropriate compromise which has to be made between these contra- 
dictory factors, so as to maximize system availability. 
Thus, the computation of the optimum dump interval is presented in Section 3, 
while Section 4 is devoted to the computation of the optimum number of failure tests 
between dumps. 
In Section 5 an algorithm is proposed to obtain the optimal dump interval and the 
number of failure tests between dumps, computational problems associated with the 
model, and numerical examples, are discussed as well. 
The work presented in this paper can be viewed as a logical consequence of [6], 
where a roll-back recovery mechanism was analyzed and the problem of choosing an 
optimum checkpoint interval was formulated and solved, as well as of [9] where the 
mathematical tools for handling time-dependent failure rates in such models have 
been developed. 
The results of the present paper are obtained as a function of certain parameters, 
such as the cost of creating dumps, the cost of making a failure test, the failure rate 
with the saw-tooth behavior described above or with constant or other time-depend- 
ent behavior. As far as the general methodology for availability optimization which 
we describe in this paper, these parameters can be chosen arbitrarily and introduced 
into the model. 
134 E. Gelenbe, M. Herncindez 
2. The model 
Let X, be the state of the system at time t. X, is given by 
0 if the system is able to process transactions, 
1 
x,= 
i 
if it is recovering from a failure (possibly after a failure test), 
2 if it is creating a dump, 
3 if it is making a failure or virus test. 
We assume that at time 0 the system begins its functioning being able to process 
transactions, i.e. X,=0 for t 30 is constructed as follows: 
(1) When the process enters state 2 it remains there for a random period indepen- 
dent of its past history, i.e. the time necessary for creating a dump, of general 
distribution function and with finite expected value ED. At the end of this time it 
returns to state 0. 
(2) It can be assumed, with out loss of generality, that failures do not occur during 
dumping (state 2) during the failure or virus test (state 3) or during recovery (state 1). 
(3) We denote by Zi the total time spent in take 0 (normal operation time) between 
the (i- l)th and ith failure tests, the 0th virus test is considered to be the most recent 
dump. 
(4) It is assumed that the workload after a period of unavailability remains the 
same as before the interruption (dump, failure or virus test). 
(5) Let Y, (age) be the total time spent by the system in state 0 since the most recent 
dump preceding t: 
I 
f 
Y, = 
;
l(X,=O)du, where t”=sup{o: u-et and X,=2}. 
A transition from state 0 to state 1 occurs at some instant t due to the occurrence of 
a failure. Then the recovery time, i.e. the time spent in state 1 before the return to 
state 0, is given by a function r( Y,) which depends linearly on the age Y,, where 
r(Y,)=crY,+P 
and CI, /? > 0 are constants. This formula can be justified as follows. After a failure, all 
the work done during time Y, must be done again; this takes a time ct Y,. The fixed time 
necessary to restart and reload the system being p. 
(6) The instants of failure constitute a time-dependent Poisson process of para- 
meter y( Y,). The virus or failure tests have an effect on the time-dependent failure rate 
as shown in Fig. 1. A failure at time t will force the process X, to go from state 0 to 
state 1. 
(7) The system enters state 3 if a virus test is being made, and the time for making 
a virus test is a random variable of general distribution function and with finite 
expected value E V. At the end of the check with probability p an error is detected and 
the system enters state 1 for recovery, otherwise, it returns to state 0. The recovery 
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Dump Tl T2 ... Time 
Ti = i-th failure test 
Fig. 1. The behavior of the failure rate y(t). 
function r^(Y,) in this case will differ from r(Y,) in the fixed cost fi. 
f( YJ=aY,+j7. 
(8) The availability of the system is simply the proportion of time spent by the 
system in state 0. In steady state, it is the probability that the system is in state 0. 
3. Interval between two successive dumps 
We begin the analysis of the system presented in the previous section by considering 
an interval between two successive dumps, during which failure tests are made and 
failures may occur. In Fig. 2 we represent one such typical interval. 
The average length of such an interval will be the sum of the total expected times 
spent in normal operation, in failure recovery, in carrying out the failure tests and 
creating the dumps. We shall examine each component of this duration, and compute 
its average value. 
Let us first consider the total expected time spent in failure recovery between 
successive dumps. Clearly, it will be the expected time for recovery from failure test 
errors plus the expected recovery time for the time-dependent Poisson failures. We 
first compute the latter. 
Assuming that there are n failures between the (i- 1)th and ith failure tests, i.e. 
during zi time units in normal operation, let x1 < ... <x, be the failure instants. As 
a consequence of the age-dependent Poisson assumption about failure instants, it is 
known (e.g. [S] p. 153) that for small enough interval of time 6j, the conditional 
probability that failure j will occur in the small interval [mj, mj+6j] is given by 
P(mj < Xj< mj + 6j, 1 <j < n 1 n failures during zi time units in normal operation) 
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F = Failure 
TI = I-th failure test 
Fig. 2. The interval between dumps. 
where 
The recovery time from the n failures occurred in the ith failure test interval, will 
then be 
because the cost function for recovery r(.) implies that all transactions which were 
processed by the system since the most recent dump have to be processed again. 
Taking the expected value with respect to the number of failures, we obtain the 
following expression for the average recovery cost from random failures during zi 
units of normal operation: 
eercZi)r(zi)” 1 
fn n! ~ 
s 
Z,- 1 +zi 
r(zi) =,-I 
y(u)r(zl+...+zi-i+u)du 
n=O 
=i 
=,Fl+Z* 
y(u)r(zl + ... +zi-r+U)dU. 
=i- L 
If we assume that there are k failure tests in the dump interval, we have the following 
expression for the total expected time for recovery in between two successive dumps, 
where the first term corresponds to recovery due to errors detected during failure tests 
and the second one to failures arriving to the system. 
Q&r..., zk)=p~ =l+“‘+=i;(u)du+k~ J i=l 0 J 
2<-,+2i 
y(u)r(zl + ... +z,-1 +u)du 
i=l Z.-I 
and the total expected length of the interval between dumps, which we denote by 
El(k) is: 
k+l 
J 
ZI 1 + =I +c y(u)r(zl + ... +zi-r+u)dU 
i=l zl-l 
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or 
k+l 
EZ(k)=ED+kEV+ C Zj+Qk(Zl, . . ..Zk). 
j=l 
This expectation allows us to compute the stationary probabilities (nj) of the 
process {X,, t >,O}, applying the regenerative property [4] to the interval between 
dumps El(k): 
Z7j’ lim P[X,=j], j=O, 1,2,3 
1-m 
and to compute them as follows: 
u, =Qkh ... rzk), 
El(k) 
ED 
n2 = El(k)’ 
kEV 
n3=El(k)’ 
Obviously, we also have the normalizing constraint: 
Indeed, it can be seen that {X,, t >O} is a Markov renewal process, where the 
instants before or after each dump are the regeneration points of the process, and 
these formulae are a simple consequence of this fact. 
3.1. Computation of the virus test intervals 
In the previous section we computed the total average time between successive 
dumps, assuming that the length of each of the intervals between virus tests was given. 
In this section we turn our attention to the appropriate choice of the Zi, i.e. the time in 
normal operation between the (i- 1)th and the ith virus test. 
We shall make the following assumption which is based on a physical motivation: 
the total expected cost of each failure test in the same interval between dumps is kept 
constant. The “common sense” motivation behind this assumption is that during 
system operation, we would like that the availability of the system to normal 
transaction processing remain constant. Indeed, it would be rather annoying to a user 
that the quality of service received is very different depending on when the system is 
being accessed. 
As a consequence of this assumption, we shall see that as we move away in time 
from the most recent dump, the successive virus tests must be carried out more 
frequently. Indeed, the expected cost of a virus test (which includes the cost of carrying 
out failure recovery) obviously increases as we move away from the most recent dump. 
This effect will be more or less important depending on the value of the probability of 
discovering an error during a virus test. 
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This assumption translates into the following general expression which relates the 
expected cost of the first failure test, to that of the ith one: 
zi- , +zi s z*+ .” +zi =cC(Zl+ ‘.’ +Zi_l) Wdu+ F(u) du Z,- 1 0 
s z,-,+z, + y(u)r(u)du t’li=2, . . . ,k. zi- 1 (1) 
In order to simplify the notation we write 
s z, - 1 + zi TR(Zi)= r(4r(u) du, =i-I 
=i 
T(Zi)= Y (4 du> 
0 
R^(zi)= j;i(u)du= j;(nu+j)du 
and (1) becomes 
rR(zl)+pR^(zl)=cc(zl + “’ +Zi-l)T(Zi)+pi(Zl+ ‘.. +Zi)+TR(Zi) 
Vi=2,...,k, (2) 
which allows us to compute the different Zi as a function of z1 with the constraint that 
each zi must be positive. 
Thus, we have now reduced the problem of computing the Zi to that of computing 
zl. This will be carried out algorithmically in Section 5. 
3.1.1. An example of a time-dependentfailure rate 
An often used time-dependent failure rate is the Weibull density [14] given by 
where u 2 0 represents the time and y, y. 2 0 and 0 > 0 are constants. Notice that this 
is a slight generalization of the usual Weibull failure rate [ 161 often used in reliability 
theory. When 8 = 1, we merely have a time-independent failure rate y + y. correspond- 
ing to a Poisson failure process. When f3 = 2 we have a linearly increasing failure rate; 
in general, the failure rate increases when 8 > 1. This failure process is thus a conveni- 
ent representation of increasing, decreasing, or constant failure rates. 
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Substituting in (2) we obtain the following equation for Zi, the length of the ith 
interval between failure or virus tests, which can be obtained numerically from 
aS’;-‘(y(Zt-~+Zt)“+~~Zi-~ZP-~)+~(S2~)+plj(Sl)f~(Zt-~+Zt)Bt’ 
_-,~+l_pa yffe 
e+i 2 
z:-$Zi =o: (3) 
where 
i-l 
i-l m-l 
P-l= 1 1 z,z,. 
m=l n=l 
3.1.2. An example with the saw-tooth failure rate 
In this case, y(u) has the behavior described in the following equations, which can be 
seen in Fig. 1. 
Y(r)=Yo+P, o<t<z1, 
Y(t)=Yo+Y(t-Zl), zl<t<zl+Z2, 
Y(t)=Yo+Y(t-CjIl: Zj), C::=: Zj~t<Cf=, Zj. 
Clearly, 
T(Zi)=y ~ +yOZi, 
Substituting in (2) we obtain the following equation for the interval zi as a function of 
the i- 1 preceding intervals: 
(4) 
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4. Number of virus tests in the dump interval 
In the previous sections we have 
l obtained the system availability assuming that the Zi are known and that the 
number of failure tests k is fixed, 
l derived a relationship between the successive zi, assuming that z1 is given. 
Thus, we now have to develop a method to compute both k and z1 in order to have 
a complete analysis of the system. These will be computed with the objective of 
maximizing system availability. 
Let us turn to the problem of choosing k. We formulate it as follows. 
After the (i- 1)th failure test, a dump is carried out if the total expected cost 
associated with a new failure test is greater than the cost of making a dump. 
More formally let k be the number of failure tests made in the interval between two 
successive dumps; we then choose 
k=inf(i: Qi(z 19 ...,zi)2ED}* (5) 
k will be determined numerically from the above expression, and will lead to the 
system availability IZ, as a function of zl: 
II,= 
cJ:l Zj 
ED+kEV+CjLiZj+Q,(Z,,...,Z,)’ 
(6) 
Finally, z1 will be chosen so as to maximize n,, as shown in the next section. 
5. Numerical implementation 
We now turn to the numerical implementation of the above results. 
The first problem we have to face is the computation of the first interval between the 
last dump and the first virus test (zl), which then leads to the computation of the 
remaining Zi. 
The second problem to be solved is the computation of the number (k) of failure 
tests in the interval between dumps satisfying (5). 
Both of these computational problems will be solved using the algorithm given 
below. 
We first choose an arbitrary z1 and read the parameters of the model CC, p, 8, y, p, 8, 
ED, E V, where tl is the proportion of transactions to be reprocessed if a failure has 
been detected, p the fixed reloading cost of recovery, B the fixed cost of recovery, y the 
parameter of the failure rate, p the probability of finding an error during a virus test, 
8 the parameter of the Weibull failure rate, ED the expected time for making a dump, 
and E V is the expected time for making a failure test. 
We have a formula to compute zi as a function of z 1, . . . , Zi _ 1 (see equations (3) or (4) 
depending on the shape of the failure rate). In other words, we can compute z2 if we 
know zl. We can compute z3 using the values of z1 and the computed z2 and so on. 
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Fig. 3. Behavior of II,, as a function of z1 
7 = 0.001 
P = 0.001 
e = 1.1 
ED= 200 
; 1 :o 
6 = 1 
7 = 0.001 
P = 0.001 
e = 1.1 
ED= 200 
Fig. 4. Behavior of QI(zI) as a function of z1 
This sequence of computations should be stopped as soon as the expected cost for 
reprocessing transactions is larger than or equal to the expected time ED for making 
a dump as indicated in (5). 
Since the availability depends on a given value of z1 , let us call it flo(zl). We then 
determine numerically the value of z1 maximizing ZI,,, and call this optimal value zf . 
In Fig. 3, we present a numerical example of the dependence of Lro(z,) on zr. 
Clearly, Qi(zi) is an increasing function with values in [0, ED]. Then z: will be 
bound by the condition 
See Fig. 4 for an example of Q1 (zl). 
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zr is found by carrying out a binary search in the interval [L,,Ls], where 
L,=O and Ls=min (x: Qi(x)=ED}, 
where the lower bound of z;” is clearly 0, while its upper bound is determined so that 
the expected total cost Qi(zi) of the first failure test interval does not exceed ED. 
5.1. Algorithm 
In the following we detail the recursive procedure binary(l,,&,MAX) for the 
binary search of the maximum of function n, in the interval [L,, Ls] and the function 
II,@,), which computes II0 for a given zl. Note that in the case of a general Weibull 
rate we compute zi using equation (3) and in the case of a saw-tooth failure rate we use 
equation (4). 
Function Ii’, 
Read parameters cr, p, by, p, 0, ED, EV 
i=l 
Repeat 
i=i+l 
Compute Zi using equation (3) 
Until Qi(zl , . . . , Zi) > ED (equation (5)) 
k=i-1 
Compute I7, (equation (6)) 
Send I7, 
Procedure binary (L,, Ls, MAX) 
&= 
L1+Ls 
~ . Left ZI, = UO(L,); Right ZIO = n0 (L,) 2 , 
IfL,<>Ls+E 
then begin 
If Left II, = Right II0 
then begin 
LMI = 
L+LM LM+Ls -; LMS=- 
2 2 
Left JI, = Z7,(L,,); Right II, =I7,(L,,) 
end 
If Left ZZO <Right ZI, 
then binary (LM, Ls, MAX) 
else binary (L,, LM, MAX) 
end 
else Send MAX = L, 
Algorithm Search-z: 
scsmall; L,cO 
Find Ls=minx: Q1(x)=ED 
binary (L,, Ls, z;“) 
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Fig. 5. z1 as a function of ED (Weibull). 
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Fig. 6. z1 as a function of y (Weibull). 
5.2. Numerical results for Weibull failure rate 
The results are presented for the Weibull failure rate which has been widely used in 
reliability models. We first present some numerical examples concerning zr , the total 
time in normal operation between the last dump and the first failure test. Then we turn 
to various numerical examples showing how system parameters affect system avail- 
ability when zr and k are chosen so as to maximize it. 
With regard to zr we notice the following effects: 
If the cost ED for making a dump increases then the interval z: also increases (see 
Fig. 5) 
If the parameter y of the failure rate increases (for the three cases constant, linear 
and Weibull) clearly the failure rate also increases and the first failure test has to be 
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Fig. 7. z1 as a function of p (Weibull). 
-7 = 0.001 
8 = 1.01 
ED= 100 
- 
; 5 :o 
/3 = 1 
P 
0 0.015 
Fig. 8. II, as a function of p (Weibull). 
made earlier. Indeed, if the risk of failure is larger, it would be better to make a failure 
test earlier than if this risk is smaller (see Fig. 6) 
l Similarly, if the probability p of discovering an error during a failure test is greater, 
then the interval zt should be smaller (see Fig. 7) 
Let us now turn to some results concerning system availability: 
l If the probability p of finding a failure test error decreases then the availability will 
increase (see Fig. 8) 
l If the cost ED of a dump increases, then the availability will obviously decrease (see 
Fig. 9) 
The results were also verified for a saw-tooth failure rate. 
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Fig. 9. IZ, as a function of ED (Weibull). 
7 = 0.001 
P = 0.0001 
0 = 1.01 
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1 
P = 0.0001 
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0 0.0006 
Fig. 10. II, as a function of y0 (saw-tooth). 
5.3. Numerical results for a saw-tooth failure rate 
In Fig. 10 we consider the behavior of the availability no for a sawtooth-type 
time-dependent failure rate discussed in Section 3.1.2. This corresponds to the case 
where during a failure test, errors are detected with a certain probability p and 
a recovery procedure is carried out. Then the system failure rate drops to a low value 
as soon as the system begins its operation, but increases as time goes by and the 
system is used until a new failure test is carried out. 
ZI, is plotted against y. for the saw-tooth failure rate. We observe that as y0 (the rate 
of increase of the failure rate) increases, the availability n, decreases, as one may 
expect. Keeping the same model parameters (a = 1, j3 = 10, I= 1, p =O.OOOl, ED = 5000, 
EV=2) as in Fig. 10, we show the variation of n, versus y for the case of a linear 
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Fig. 11. II, as a function of ‘J (Weibull). 
Weibull failure rate (i.e. without the saw-tooth behavior) in Fig. 11. We see that the 
availability is appreciably greater in the saw-tooth case, showing that the failure tests 
are having the desired effect of improving system availability. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we propose the use of “failure tests” or “virus tests” in order to 
enhance the reliability and availability of a transaction oriented software system. 
The basic idea is to carry out software tests and verifications at regular intervals 
concerning the data the system contains, and/or the transactions it has executed, in 
order to detect possible errors or inconsistencies. The purpose is to reduce the 
consequence such errors may have on system crashes, or to eliminate errors which 
would be detected later during normal system operation. 
We discuss the appropriate choice of the number of failure tests and of the time 
between successive checks, assuming that the system is prone to failures. We expect 
that the system will also be equipped with a “roll-back recovery”-type mechanism in 
order to handle failures; this mechanism will be used for failure recovery both after 
a failure test and for random failures which occur during system operation. The basic 
time structure of system operation is established by the sequence of dumps, and virus 
or failure tests are carried between successive dumps. 
A model is constructed in order to compute the best possible choice of intervals 
between dumps and failure test intervals so as to maximize system availability. This 
model is based on techniques initially developed in [6] for computing optimal 
checkpoint intervals, and in [9] which is devoted to time-dependent failure mechan- 
isms and their analysis. 
Numerical procedures for handling our model are developed and described, and 
examples are presented to illustrate the results we obtain. 
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It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the theory and practice of software 
systems having enhanced reliability properties. 
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